contributed to the crisis had been changed. National sovereignty made direct commercial bank involvement in the setting of local economic policies a political impossibility. The IMF was the answer to this problem. The Fund was ideally placed, as an apparently independent international financial institution, to determine and monitor the economic policies, going forward, of the debtor nations.
The focus of the IMF reform programs was to enable debtors to generate sufficient foreign exchange resources to service their debts. 1 The policies imposed to achieve this typically included: 2  reductions in the budget deficit to limit inflation, and the need for foreign borrowing,  limits on domestic credit expansion to control inflation,  exchange rate devaluations to discourage imports and encourage exports, and  generally a much reduced role for government and a much increased role for markets.
Other policies included (i) higher income and sales taxes, (ii) higher charges for stateproduced goods and services such as electricity and water, (iii) privatisation of stateowned companies, (iv) deregulation of the labour market, and (v) reform of tariffs and import quota regimes.
3
The combined effect of this suite of policies was that the 1980s were a decade in which net capital flows from these nations were northbound, a decade in which infrastructure crumbled, a decade in which life expectancy fell in Sub-Saharan Africa. 4 This entire process became known as 'structural adjustment', a "stunningly bland name" 5 for policies with a stunningly high human cost. 6 This should, however, be unsurprising. For the principal focus of the IMF had been to ensure the debtor nations could earn sufficient foreign exchange to service their debts.
The IMF's main goal in the 1980s was to ensure the survival, not of poor people, but of the international financial system.
Asia's crisis in 1997 was fundamentally different from the 1980s debt crisis: most debt was private, not public or quasi-public, and it was not a crisis caused by over- higher interest rates and budget tightening being prescribed by the Fund. The U.S.
Treasury took the message on board and managed in turn to persuade the Fund. So, about 15 months after the onset of the crisis, the IMF began to agree to more expansionary policy settings. While the Fund eventually came around, the crisis was deepened by its initial misdiagnosis, and considerable otherwise avoidable human suffering resulted.
In the meantime, Malaysia had adopted more successful strategies, especially in their impact on the poor. Malaysia refused IMF funding and advice and set its own course. The policies Malaysia settled on were in sharp contrast to the Fund's. Malaysia imposed capital outflow controls to keep foreign capital within the country, and pegged the ringgit to the U.S. dollar. Malaysia was thus able to ease monetary policy and pursue expansionary fiscal policies, without being hampered by severe capital outflows.
Malaysia had created as close to a laboratory experiment as one ever gets in economics.
Thailand and Korea were seeking to exit the Asian Crisis using the Fund's policies, while
Malaysia was charting a different course. (Indonesia's high debt levels meant its problems were quite different).
All three economies recovered from the crisis, but Malaysia's recovery was more rapid, and its poor were harmed far less by its recovery policies than were the poor in countries following the IMF approach. 8 In the words of Kaplan and Rodrik, "compared to IMF programs, we find that the Malaysian policies provided faster economic recovery… smaller declines in employment and real wages, and more rapid turn around in the stock product of policies which the IMF had developed or with which it agreed. The crisis deepened until late 2001 when Argentina had to default on its external debt.
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The IMF emerged from Argentina's collapse with its credibility in tatters. Never before had a country that had so faithfully followed the Fund's policies collapsed so severely.
At this point the Fund had few friends. Criticism of the Fund's policy prescriptions had been sustained, fierce and unrelenting from the left ever since the early-to-mid 1980s, principally for the impact of its policies on the poor and because the Fund was seen, by the left, to be the handmaiden of the G-7 nations and particularly of their banking sectors. essentially been a continuation of the policies under SAPs, and PRSPs don't contemplate alternative approaches to poverty reduction.
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In short, the massive gap between Fund rhetoric and policies remained.
14

The IMF and Poverty in Africa
In 2000, Michel Camdessus, the Fund's Managing Director said, the greatest concern of our time is poverty … it is the ultimate systemic threat facing humanity. … If the poor are left hopeless, poverty will undermine the fabric of our societies through confrontation, violence, and civil disorder. We cannot afford to ignore poverty, wherever it exists...
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The IMF has its own internal evaluation division, the Independent Evaluation Office, and in March 2007, the IEO released an Evaluation Report, "The IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa". 16 The Report concluded that there were differences of views among the Executive Board of the Fund about the IMF's role and policies in poor countries, and that
lacking clarity on what they should do on the mobilization of aid, … and the application of poverty and social impact analysis, IMF staff tended to focus on macroeconomic stability, in line with the institution's core mandate and their deeply ingrained professional culture.
17
In other words, some seven years after the replacement of Structural Adjustment
Programs with Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, IMF staff were unclear on the priority to give to poverty reduction and how to achieve it, and so sought to attain what they knew how to attain: macroeconomic stability. In the first year or two of This is a perfect illustration of the damage that the Fund's obsession with the macroeconomic profile of a country can do. The Fund believes that the best way to help a nation is to ensure that its inflation is tightly constrained, its government kept small so as not to crowd out private sector activity, and everything possible is done to promote its exports.
Yet there is an ever-increasing body of evidence that suggests that less rigid inflationary controls give developing economies more room within which to grow, and that government is often the only potential delivery system for many essential social services in these nations. Changing this fundamental belief system of the IMF will take time. It is a massive undertaking to get thousands of staff to reconceive how they see the world. However, there is one change that can be implemented almost immediately, and that is to stop the socialisation of private sector debt.
The Socialisation of Private Sector Debt
One of the depressingly consistent themes in the aftermath of each financial crisis is the socialisation of private sector debt -a consequence which the IMF either engineers or to which it acquiesces.
After the debt crisis broke in 1982 the creditors persuaded each nation to represent all debtors within its borders in the rescheduling negotiations and to bring all the debts of those debtors under its sovereign guarantee. The first step was necessary. The second was not.
Bringing all debts under the sovereign guarantee improved the security of the creditors. It was also an utterly unjustifiable charge on the common people of these countries as these loans were ultimately serviced by higher taxes and lower social services.
Fifteen years later the nature of the crisis in Asia was quite different, but the resolution of it was the same -the poor in the debtor countries were exploited -this time by a process engineered by the IMF. The IMF organised bailouts of Indonesia, Thailand and Korea which were in fact long-term loans made on condition they be used to repay creditors. 21 These loans thus became debts of the nation and the bailouts were of the creditors, not the debtor nations at all. 22 It was years before bailouts were generally understood to be "a welfare system for Wall Street" 23 as the funds flowed directly through to creditors.
To make matters worse, the creditors with debts due typically held short-term bondsand short-term debt is particularly destabilising for developing countries. So the IMF bailouts encouraged precisely the type of debt that a stable system would discourage.
The idea was that the nations would again take responsibility for the indebtedness of corporations, use the bailout loans to pay off the foreign creditors, and later recover the debts from the corporate debtors. The Indonesian government recovered some 30 per cent of the value of the loans it incurred on behalf of the banking sector. 24 The other 70 per cent became a charge on the Indonesian people.
After Argentina's economic implosion, the international financial community, with the assistance of a compliant Argentine government and the IMF, found two ways to socialise private indebtedness. The first was the now familiar IMF bailout, in this case a massive US$40 billion loan to Argentina in late 2000, that was required to be used to repay a mix of public and corporate debt so that private sector debt was in effect replaced by debt of the nation. 25 The second was a new way to achieve an old end: having the people repay corporate debts. This technique was known as "pesofication".
Under pesofication, dollar-denominated bank loans and deposits were redenominated in pesos. Banks were required to convert their assets (such as loans) into pesos at a one-forone rate and their liabilities (such as deposits) into pesos at a rate of 1.4 to 1. This The IMF must stop facilitating bailouts in which anything other than sovereign debt is repaid -if poor countries choose to bail out their corporate sectors they should do so openly, and certainly not through the subterfuge of an IMF orchestrated bailout package.
For national governments to assume corporate debt in desperately poor countries rewards the rich in those countries at the direct expense of the poor. It is a practice the IMF must stop orchestrating.
What the IMF Says About Itself
In 2001  "most PRSPs fall short of providing a strategic road map for policymaking, especially in the area of macroeconomic and related structural policies"  "On balance, joint staff assessments do not perform adequately the many tasks expected of them", and  "Success in embedding the PRGF in the overall strategy for growth and poverty reduction has been limited in most cases -partly reflecting shortcomings in the strategies themselves".
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For an international organisation these words are straight shooting. So why, given its rhetorical commitment to fighting poverty, does the IMF more often promote poverty than reduce it?
How Do We Get the Fund to Effectively Reduce Poverty?
For Joseph Stiglitz, the answer to this question has four parts. In his view, the Fund's economists: (i) "frequently lack extensive experience in the country", (ii) are not nearly as good or bright as they think they are, (iii) tend to use poor economics, and (iv) "close themselves off from outside criticism and advice."
Notwithstanding the respect I have for Joe Stiglitz, I wonder whether he has this quite right. One doesn't need to be among the brightest graduates of a first-rate university to know that austerity will make a contractionary crisis worse or that Argentina cannot peg its currency to that of the U.S. dollar indefinitely without it becoming overvalued. Any good undergraduate economic student knows these things.
Stiglitz's explanations, written in anger at the suffering he had seen the IMF's policies cause, are too pat. I agree that the Fund's fly in -fly out model tends to deny their experts the local knowledge they need to craft appropriate policies, and reinforces their tendency to make unwarranted assumptions about the strength or even existence of local 29 Available at <www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/eval_07062004.html>. 30 Available at <www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/pdf/07062004/summary.pdf>.
institutions such as the rule of law. I also agree that the Fund tends to close itself off from outside criticism and advice.
But on the other issues, it is not that the Fund's experts are not bright enough or use outdated and poor economic models. The core problem is that the IMF has become a fundamentalist organization. It subscribes utterly to market fundamentalism -the belief that markets will always best allocate resources and provide needed services. greater than it was before the crisis. 32 The role of the Fund has thus been expanded greatly and its staffing numbers are now growing as strongly as before they declined.
The Fund's recent rhetoric has been that it has learned from its errors in Asia in the late 1990s and has revised its policies so that there is now considerable scope for countercyclical and expansionary policies. And at the height of the recent crisis some countries were permitted to run moderately expansionary policies -while most OECD nations were enacting aggressively expansionary stimulus packages. However, by 2010 the IMF's deeply ingrained beliefs were reasserting themselves and pro-cyclical contractionary policies were once again the norm. A study chose 13 IMF agreements with poorer nations as a representative sample, and found that in 2009 fiscal expansion was on average 1.5% of GDP, but for 2010 the average was a contraction of 0.5% of GDP. 33 An
Oxfam study in July 2010 found that one-half of African countries and three-fourths of other developing nations with IMF programs in place were being required to reduce spending in 2010, precisely when expansionary policy settings were needed to offset reduced export revenues. One of the Fund's essential difficulties lies in the narrow backgrounds of its staff. The
World Bank, to fulfil its remit, needs economists and finance professionals, but it also needs engineers, scientists and experts in social policy, development and many other fields. This diverse mix of people gives rise to strong debates within the Bank which have assisted it in reassessing its roles and how best to fulfil them. The Fund, on the other hand, draws its staff from essentially two sources: national central banks and PhD programs in macroeconomics (and even then the graduates of certain faculties are much preferred over those from other, more liberal, faculties).
Yet the skill set and attitudes required to be successful in a central bank are utterly different from those required to redirect and turn around the economy of a failing nation.
In the corporate world, technocrats who are effective in highly structured corporations rarely, if ever, have the entrepreneurial zeal and instincts that characterise those people who make careers out of rescuing failing companies. 35 Why should we expect this to be any different at all at the sovereign level?
As long ago as the 1990s, Walter Wriston, the former Chair of Citibank, said, "once the IMF got into the business of advising governments on policy it created more trouble than it cured." 36 This should be unsurprising, as the IMF was never intended, and thus never designed, to advise governments on policy generally. Its original remit was exchange rate policy. Its staffing profile made perfect sense given its original role. Yet its role has changed, utterly, while the profile of its staff, and more importantly their prevailing mindset, remain unchanged.
Strong and visionary leadership, over a sustained period of time, plus further and more radical reforms to the voting rights of member countries, will be required if true reform of the IMF is ever to be achieved. Until that happens, whenever developing nations have to go to the Fund for assistance, history tells us that the price they will pay will be high indeed, and will fall principally upon the poorest of their people. 
